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Common Intention Constructive Trusts and the Role of Imputation in Theory 
and Practice: Barnes v Phillips 
 
Barnes v Phillips [2015] EWCA Civ 1056; [2016] HLR 3 
 
Andy Hayward* 
 
Following the Supreme Court decision in Jones v Kernott, imputation of fair shares now 
exists as a possibility in the quantification (but not acquisition) of beneficial ownership under 
a common intention constructive trust.
1
 Crucially, though, fairness is always a residual 
option. In joint legal title cases, fairness can only be used once an express or inferred common 
intention to depart from equal sharing under the beneficial joint tenancy is found and, in 
addition, once an express or inferred common intention as to the parties’ precise shares in the 
beneficial ownership cannot be identified by the court. This sanctioning of fairness in Kernott 
built upon earlier dicta by Chadwick LJ in Oxley v Hiscock
2
 and developed the principles laid 
down in the House of Lords decision in Stack v Dowden.
3
 
 
After Kernott, it was questioned whether the explicit permission to impute shares on the basis 
of fairness would prove all too tempting for the judiciary, particularly when it is remembered 
that these disputes are rarely ‘flood-lit by clear evidence’.4 In particular, would judges exploit 
the overly academic distinction between inference and imputation to reach the desired, 
residual option? It was inevitable that this issue would be litigated and this forms the basis of 
the Court of Appeal decision in Barnes v Phillips.
5
  
 
Facts and Legal Issues 
 
Mr Barnes and Miss Phillips started a relationship in 1983 and began cohabiting in rented 
accommodation in 1989. Two children were born. In 1996 a property was purchased in joint 
names for approximately £135,000 and this was financed through a £25,000 deposit and a 
mortgage secured for the remainder. Mr Barnes was a self-employed businessman and 
primarily paid the mortgage repayments whereas Miss Phillips, a nurse, paid for the bills and 
other expenditure. Both contributed towards renovations to the property. During the course of 
their relationship, Mr Barnes bought three other properties in his sole name that he rented out 
to generate additional income. After experiencing financial difficulties, Mr Barnes 
encouraged Miss Phillips to consent to re-mortgaging the property and this eventually took 
place in 2005. In June 2005, the relationship broke down and Mr Barnes moved into one of 
his other properties. From this point in time to 2008, both contributed to the mortgage with 
Miss Phillips providing approximately £12,500 and Mr Barnes providing £22,000. In 
addition, the parties agreed that Mr Barnes would pay £250 per month to maintain the 
children. From 2008, Miss Phillips assumed sole responsibility for discharging the mortgage, 
caring for the children and covering expenditure in relation to the property. No accurate 
valuation occurred in 2008 but it was estimated that the property was now worth £497,500.  
 
Miss Phillips made an application under section 14 of the Trusts of Land and Appointment of 
Trustees Act 1996, which was heard by HH Judge Madge. Recognising that there was a 
conflict of evidence, HH Judge Madge believed Miss Phillips to be honest and truthful and 
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that Mr Barnes’ evidence required independent corroboration for it to be accepted by the 
court. Although there had been unequal financial contribution to the purchase of the home, 
they were both joint tenants in law and in equity with each contributing to what was ‘in effect, 
a marriage without a wedding ceremony’.6 Despite some discussions in text messages, HH 
Judge Madge accepted that there was no real evidence that they had an actual common 
intention that their shares in the property would change. Nevertheless, as it was not possible 
to determine what the actual intentions of the parties were, each was entitled to a fair share. 
On that basis and in light of Miss Phillips assuming all responsibility for the mortgage and the 
property from 2008 onwards, Miss Phillips was awarded 85% and Mr Barnes received 15% 
of the beneficial ownership. Mr Barnes appealed on the basis of three points.
7
 Firstly, that 
having found no agreement to vary beneficial ownership, it was not open to HH Judge Madge 
to impute to the parties that particular intention. Secondly, that the judge was plainly wrong to 
reach a division of 85/15 and, thirdly, it was wrong to take into account the lack of child 
support payments when determining quantum.  
 
The Court of Appeal Decision 
 
In the Court of Appeal, Lloyd Jones LJ (with whom Longmore and Hayden LJJ agreed) 
dismissed Mr Barnes’ appeal. In relation to the argument that HH Judge Madge was not open 
to impute to the parties an intention to vary, Lloyd Jones LJ set out the relevant principles 
from paragraph 51 in Kernott and noted that where there was no common intention to vary 
beneficial ownership, the parties would remain joint tenants in equity until severance 
occurred.
8
 Furthermore, there needed to be express evidence or evidence inferred through 
conduct of an intention to share unequally and it was not open for the court at this stage to 
impute that intention. Despite arguments made by Mr Barnes’ counsel to the contrary and 
even after conceding that ‘one person’s inference will be another person’s imputation’,9 Lloyd 
Jones LJ believed that HH Judge Madge had not confused the terminology of inference and 
imputation.  
 
Nevertheless, Lloyd Jones LJ was critical of HH Judge Madge’s methodology noting that a 
key paragraph of his judgment was ‘very unclear’.10 As Mr Barnes was self-represented, it 
was thought that HH Judge Madge may have used ‘lay person’s language’ to explain the legal 
tests but, in spite of this fact, the reference to ‘actual common intention’ was deemed to be a 
reference to an express agreement which did not encompass an inferred intention.
11
 Lloyd 
Jones LJ viewed this as problematic because actual common intention was a term ‘wide 
enough to include both express and inferred intention’.12 By HH Judge Madge then moving to 
imputation of precise shares, a gap in the judicial reasoning occurred because he had:  
 
‘…moved directly from considering whether there was an express common intention 
to vary shares in the property to considering in what shares the parties now hold the 
property, from concluding that there was ‘’no specific agreement’’ to considering 
what intention must be imputed as to the shares. A critical step in the process is 
simply not addressed in the judgment.’13 
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Despite a key methodological stage being ‘totally absent’,14 Lloyd Jones LJ opined that HH 
Judge Madge was ‘well aware’ of the structure laid down in Kernott as he had reproduced it 
in the preceding paragraphs of his judgment.
15
 After clarifying HH Judge’s methodology, 
Lloyd Jones LJ used inference, as opposed to imputation, to find that the parties intended to 
alter the beneficial ownership. In particular, the fact that Mr Barnes kept multiple separate 
properties in his sole name coupled with him receiving all of the financial benefits of the 
remortgage revealed that when the relationship broke down there was an intention to vary 
ownership. Further evidence of this was found in Mr Barnes’ decision to stop mortgage 
repayments in 2008. 
 
In addition, Lloyd Jones LJ rejected the related appeal point that it was plainly wrong for HH 
Judge Madge to reach an 85/15 division of the beneficial ownership. In light of Mr Barnes 
obtaining around 25% of the equity in the property following the remortgage alongside him 
stopping mortgage repayments, imputation of an 85/15 division was ‘entirely appropriate’.16  
 
The final ground for appeal was that the judge was wrong in law to take into account 
supposed lack of child support payments. This argument was also rejected for being out of 
line with recognising the importance of the domestic context as emphasized in Stack.
17
 Whilst 
the court was to be alert to the risk of double liability, as increasing a share to one party for 
the other’s non-payment will not relieve the latter of their outstanding contributions to the 
Child Support Agency, the court was entitled to take this factor into account in light of the 
‘very wide terms’ in which the domestic context was expressed.18 In short, they formed part 
of the ‘financial history’ of the parties.19 
 
Analysis 
 
Despite being a relatively brief judgment, Barnes touches upon many specific facets of the 
modern implied trust framework. At a general level, it exposes the difficulties produced when 
‘the unattainable precision of property law collides with the casual inarticulacy of home 
sharing’. 20  This collision is particularly noticeable in three key areas: the judicial 
methodology employed, the strength of the presumption of beneficial joint tenancy and the 
appreciation of the domestic context. Cumulatively, the Court of Appeal’s interpretation of 
these three issues in Barnes reveals a disjuncture between the theoretical basis of these 
principles and their practical application by the judiciary. 
 
The Judicial Methodology 
 
The first issue is the Court of Appeal’s interpretation of HH Judge Madge’s application of the 
law. To displace the presumption of beneficial joint tenancy, there needs to be an express 
intention or an inferred intention based on conduct. Imputation is impermissible at this stage 
and, in theory, belongs only at the quantification stage and, furthermore, only once an express 
or inferred agreement as to the size of shares cannot be found. This point was explicitly noted 
by Lewison LJ in Geary v Rankine, a Court of Appeal decision handed down shortly after 
Kernott.
21
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 In Barnes, HH Judge Madge noted in paragraph 37 that there was no ‘actual common 
intention’22 or ‘no specific agreement’ between the parties to vary shares.23 As a result of this 
finding, he then noted in paragraph 38: 
 
‘…so this is a case where it is not possible to ascertain by direct evidence or by 
inference what the parties’ actual intention was as to the shares they would own in the 
property after the split. That means that the Claimant and Defendant are each entitled 
to that share which the court considers fair, having regard to the whole course of 
dealing between them in relation to the property. I have to impute the parties' 
intention by considering what is fair.’24 
 
At face value, there appears to be a clear omission here. In paragraph 37, it was probable that 
HH Judge Madge was referring to an express agreement, particularly in light of his analysis 
of text messages between the parties that revealed, albeit in a fragmented manner, that no 
agreement had been reached. Lloyd Jones LJ acknowledged that this was indeed the case.
25
 
Jumping then to imputation of precise shares in paragraph 38 shows that consideration of 
whether conduct could have generated an inference of a common intention to depart from 
equal sharing was simply ignored. 
 
The fact that HH Judge Madge shifted too readily towards imputing fair shares is 
controversial but perhaps not surprising. What is more concerning is the ease in which the 
Court of Appeal sought to minimise that oversight and revise the steps undertaken by the 
judge. Firstly, Lloyd Jones LJ stated that the first instance judge was ‘well aware of the 
structure laid down in Jones v Kernott’26 as he had ‘set it out in great detail in his judgment’.27 
It is true that HH Judge Madge did articulate the Kernott framework but nevertheless it is 
perhaps obvious to point out that a judge knowing a test is not the same as a judge, in fact, 
applying a test. Secondly, and again suggestive of endorsing imputation of shares on the basis 
of fairness, the Court of Appeal inferred that a step had actually been concluded after 
previously stating the exact opposite. Despite noting that this ‘critical step’ was not 
addressed,
28
 the Court of Appeal concluded that HH Judge Madge:  
 
‘…must have appreciated that there would be no point in discussing the shares in 
which the property is held following variation if no common intention to vary had 
been established’.29  
 
This reasoning is open to challenge. Of course a degree of deference should be given to the 
first instance judge who has seen and heard the litigants but here, and almost like an act of 
imputing intentions to the judge as opposed to the parties, additional steps in HH Judge 
Madge’s analysis were simply assumed by the court. This approach is problematic on many 
levels but suggests that the judicial treatment of the distinction between inference and 
imputation, particularly in the lower courts, is not being rigorously policed.
30
  
 
                                                        
22
 Barnes [2015] EWCA Civ 1056; [2016] HLR 3 at [14] reproducing [37] of HH Judge Madge’s 
decision.  
23
 Barnes [2015] EWCA Civ 1056; [2016] HLR 3 at [14]. 
24
 Barnes [2015] EWCA Civ 1056; [2016] HLR 3 at [16] reproducing [38] of HH Judge Madge’s 
decision. 
25
 Barnes [2015] EWCA Civ 1056; [2016] HLR 3 at [27].  
26
 Barnes [2015] EWCA Civ 1056; [2016] HLR 3 at [29]. 
27
 Barnes [2015] EWCA Civ 1056; [2016] HLR 3 at [29]. 
28
 Barnes [2015] EWCA Civ 1056; [2016] HLR 3 at [29]. 
29
 Barnes [2015] EWCA Civ 1056; [2016] HLR 3 at [29]. 
30 See N Piska, ‘Intention, Fairness and the Presumption of Resulting Trust after Stack v Dowden’ 
(2008) 71(1) Modern Law Review 114. 
To an extent, this insouciance could be unavoidable. As the distinction between inference and 
imputation is so fine, trying to adhere to the methodology of paragraph 51 in Kernott becomes 
unrealistic when applied in practice. In addition, it may be cumbersome to apply because 
paragraph 51 forces the judge into an exploration of two separate and artificial questions; 
namely, whether there was a common intention to share unequally and, if yes, whether there 
was a common intention as to unequal shares. It could be argued that litigants do not address 
their minds to the former legalistic question and, perhaps, instead think of entitlement under 
the latter question using the language of shares. When litigants discuss shares (but obviously 
have no express common intention as to them), this presupposes the surmounting of the first 
hurdle, which in turn, opens up the potential for a judge to impute. Thus, using the language 
of ‘shares’ as opposed to ‘sharing’ may encourage the judge to use imputation, which, as 
Barnes states, is ‘entirely appropriate’ at this latter stage.31  
 
Collapsing these distinctions, as evidenced in Barnes, encourages discussion of the vexed 
issue of whether imputation should be used from the outset; that is, when displacing the 
beneficial joint tenancy in joint legal title disputes, or, acquiring an interest in sole cases as 
governed by Lloyds Bank v Rosset.
32
 Counsel for Miss Phillips argued that the present state of 
the law does not bar the use of imputation at this stage. After acknowledging that Lord 
Wilson in Kernott left this point open believing it would ‘merit careful thought’,33 Lloyd 
Jones LJ rejected these submissions as running counter to the majority reasoning in that case. 
This rejection is consistent with other post-Kernott cases such as Geary, Aspden v Elvy
34
 and 
Capehorn v Harris
35
 that reserve imputation to the final stages of quantum but how far it is 
convincing is debatable as Barnes, like the earlier case of Midland Bank v Cooke, involved 
parties explicitly stating that they never formed any intentions.
36
  
 
Nevertheless, there is perhaps some logic to imputation being impermissible when displacing 
the beneficial joint tenancy. If imputation was permitted here it would challenge the common 
intention foundation of the constructive trust because the courts would have to show that there 
was no evidence to displace the presumption of beneficial joint tenancy and then would create 
intentions for the parties. It would force the court into manufacturing intentions or to cobbling 
together interpretations as to conduct and thereby straining inference in a bid to ensure 
fidelity to the requirement of common intention.
37
 Lloyd Jones LJ’s observation in Barnes 
that ‘the scope for inference in this context is very extensive indeed’ may even reveal a 
preparedness on the part of the courts to perform this role and potentially manufacture 
intentions.
38
 So, whilst the two-stage approach of analysing unequal ‘sharing’ and quantifying 
‘shares’ may be overly technical, there could be a rationale underpinning it that aligns with 
why the courts treat questions of acquisition and quantification differently. This means that 
the issue is perhaps judicial interpretation of the test, not necessarily the test itself.  
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38
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[2011] UKSC 53; [2012] 1 AC 776 at [34] that ‘[i]n this area, as in many others, the scope for 
inference is wide’. 
Appellate courts enforcing the paragraph 51 framework by keeping inference and imputation 
separate may be one route to clarify the law. An alternative approach would be actually using 
imputation at an earlier stage in the process. Adopting this position may be problematic if true 
allegiance to common intention is desired, but, if the courts in the future are to avoid 
repeating the suspect judicial reasoning undertaken in Barnes, a greater honesty in how 
results are reached may be useful. After all, common intention is a suspect basis for legal 
intervention
39
 and it is widely known that ‘agreements are in reality found or denied in a 
manner quite unconnected with their actual presence or absence’.40 The work of Gardner41 is 
supportive of the view that there is a preference towards achieving what could be deemed a 
‘fair’ result in these cases and that courts have been imputing intentions to parties for quite 
some time. Using the recent case of Bhura v Bhura,
42
 Gardner supports the candour of 
Mostyn J who collapses the distinction between acquisition and quantification by asking one 
simple question: what are the parties’ beneficial shares?43  Welcoming this interpretation, 
Gardner views this as ‘an unusually visible manifestation of an otherwise semi-underground, 
but quite well-established approach’.44 So whether imputation should be explicitly permitted 
at the acquisition stage for sole legal disputes or when displacing the beneficial joint tenancy 
is a difficult question to answer but what is certain from Barnes is that a more rigorous 
interpretation of the paragraph 51 test is needed. 
 
 The Strength of the Presumption of Beneficial Joint Tenancy 
 
The second issue noticeable in Barnes relates to the supposed strength of the presumption of 
beneficial joint tenancy. The combined effect of Stack and Kernott was that joint legal title 
generated a strong presumption of beneficial joint tenancy that could be displaced only in 
‘exceptional’45 or ‘unusual’ cases.46 Whilst equity had always followed the law, this was an 
important reversal on the earlier position whereby sharing under a beneficial joint tenancy 
was rarely ‘determinative’ and could easily be displaced in favour of an unequal tenancy in 
common.
47
 Thus a common intention, objectively deduced from words or conduct, whether at 
the time of acquisition or post-acquisition, was needed to dislodge presumptive sharing.
48
 The 
rationale for this change was to discourage litigation, recognise that the operation of 
survivorship may be appropriate or desirable in an interpersonal relationship and, in theory 
(yet perhaps not in practice), provide legal certainty.
49
 
 
There is no mention whatsoever in Barnes of the strength of the presumption or the reasons 
behind its introduction. One explanation for this omission could be the reliance by HH Judge 
Madge and Lloyd Jones LJ on paragraph 51 of Kernott, which omits any reference to the high 
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burden involved in displacing the presumption. Another reason could be the factual parallels 
between Barnes and Kernott, in particular, the fact that Mr Kernott left the property for 13 
years that enabled the Supreme Court in that case to affirm displacement of the presumption 
in favour of a 90/10 division. Nevertheless, even if the presumption may not act as a deterrent 
to litigation in practice as almost all post-Stack cases have involved displacing the 
presumption of beneficial joint tenancy,
50
 the fact it is not discussed in Barnes may reveal that 
a measure intended to provide a clear starting point might have failed. Can it really be said 
post-Barnes that challenging the presumption of beneficial joint tenancy is ‘not a task to be 
lightly embarked upon’?51 In addition, the possible downplaying (or even demise?) of the 
strong presumption of beneficial joint tenancy may militate towards achieving what could be 
seen as a ‘fair’ outcome. The beneficial joint tenancy was conceptualised by the majority in 
Stack as a way to recognise sharing that often existed in cohabiting relationships. With that 
position now questionable, the paragraph 69 factors used to divine a common intention and 
displace equal sharing will come even further to the forefront. This drive towards 
exceptionalism has existed since Stack but, following Barnes, in a contest between the 
presumption itself and the factors used to displace that presumption, the factors have clearly 
prevailed. 
 
Ultimately, paragraph 51 in Kernott was an attempt by the Supreme Court to make the 
inclusion of fairness acceptable in this context by placing it at the final stage of a judicial 
methodology; a fall-back position to be used when all else fails. This residual use of fairness 
can be regarded as a necessary tool to ensure that a court reaches a result on sparse and 
conflicting evidence and Pawlowski has noted that its use is ‘eminently sensible and 
practical’ where express or inferred intentions are not visible.52 Problematically, what Barnes 
shows is that these distinctions can collapse into one another and, more importantly, that the 
court may be prepared to assume compliance with the requisite methodology.  
 
The Appreciation of the Domestic Context 
 
Another cause for concern in Barnes is the treatment of Mr Barnes’ failure to pay child 
support. Cases have been reluctant to accept this as a source of information in the divination 
of intentions. In Holman v Howes,
53
 a case decided prior to the sanctioning of fairness in 
Kernott, Lloyd LJ stated that they were ‘plainly irrelevant’ and if used would introduce the 
asking of an impermissible question namely what would be fair in the circumstances.
54
 
Deputy Judge Nicholas Strauss QC in Kernott noted that they were a ‘possibly controversial 
factor’ but, in light of the sensitivity to context endorsed by Stack, they were a relevant 
financial circumstance of the case.
55
 
 
Therefore the approach adopted in Barnes of taking these contributions into account may be 
consistent with Stack but it does raise the risk of double liability. This point was 
acknowledged yet dismissed, unpersuasively, by the court in Barnes noting that, even after 
taking them into account, they were of ‘very limited significance’.56 This approach shows 
holistic analysis and perhaps greater sensitivity to context than displayed in recent Court of 
Appeal decisions such as Curran v Collins
57
 and Graham-York v York.
58
 Nevertheless, the 
                                                        
50
 With the key exception of Fowler v Barron [2008] EWCA Civ 377; [2008] 2 FLR 831. See A 
Hayward, ‘Family Values in the Home: Fowler v Barron’ [2009] Child and Family Law Quarterly 242. 
51
 Stack [2007] UKHL 17; [2007] 2 AC 432 at [68] per Baroness Hale.  
52
 M Pawlowski, ‘Imputed intention and joint ownership - a return to common sense: Jones v Kernott’ 
[2012] Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 149, 156. See also J Mee, ‘Pettitt v Pettitt and Gissing v 
Gissing’ in C Mitchell, Landmark Cases in Equity (Hart 2012). 
53
 Holman v Howes [2007] EWCA Civ 877; [2008] 1 FLR 1217. 
54
 Holman [2007] EWCA Civ 877; [2008] 1 FLR 1217 at [32].   
55
 Jones [2009] EWHC 1713 (Ch); [2010] 1 All ER 947 at [50]. 
56
 Barnes [2015] EWCA Civ 1056; [2016] HLR 3 at [41]. 
57
 Curran v Collins [2015] EWCA Civ 404; [2016] WTLR 235. 
questioning of their relevance demonstrates that the court is confronted again with the tension 
between permissible and non-permissible factors. In short, are the courts determining 
intentions based on a course of dealings in relation to property or evaluating the parties’ 
relationship, more generally? As Dixon predicted following Stack: 
 
‘…[i]t is unclear how a trial judge is to separate a course of dealings between the 
parties which goes to the acquisition of the land (allowable), from a course of conduct 
which goes to the success of the relationship or simply reflects the normal obligations 
of everyday life (disallowable).’59 
 
With Barnes taking the failure to pay these contributions into account, one cannot help but 
wonder whether this context-specific analysis is becoming more of an estimation of party 
fault. These undercurrents were present in Stack and Kernott through Mr Stack’s exclusion 
from the home for domestic violence and Mr Kernott lengthy absence from the family home. 
However, on balance, it is arguable that in Barnes there is a sufficient basis to distinguish 
child support payments from other less obvious sources of information when divining 
intentions as they do form part of the financial history between the parties. The monetary link 
is key and thus Probert is probably correct in her opinion that, despite the ‘rhetoric’ of taking 
into account the whole course of dealings between the parties, ‘it is clear that financial 
contributions are still accorded more significance than others in quantifying interests in the 
family home’.60  
 
Conclusions 
 
Property lawyers that held reservations as to the framework created by Stack and Kernott may 
feel vindicated after the Court of Appeal decision in Barnes. The imposition of a ‘heavy’ 
burden on the claimant when displacing the beneficial joint tenancy is logical if there is a 
genuine commitment to abating litigation and providing a clear starting point.
61
 Nevertheless, 
in practice, this may not appear to be the case nor is the strength of the presumption addressed 
in Barnes. Crucially, the key issue appears to be permitting the imputation of fair shares but 
only when conventional trust analysis fails. Theoretically, this residual option makes perfect 
sense as it offers the courts the ability to adopt a reasonable solution that is cognisant of the 
domestic context based on the parties’ evidence. Yet conventional trust analysis does 
invariably fail (or the court deems that it has) and, unsurprisingly, courts engage perhaps too 
readily in the controversial process of imputing fair shares. On paper, the structured 
methodology in paragraph 51 in Kernott works; the issue is that the precise distinctions 
between express, inferred and imputed intentions remain exceedingly difficult to apply in 
practice.  
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